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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
In July 1998, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") 
arrested defendant Luis Humberto Barbosa for importing 
into this country 882 grams of cellophane-wrapped pellets 
of heroin, which he had swallowed while in Aruba and 
subsequently expelled in a hotel room in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. Following the arrest, Barbosa was charged in 
a complaint with possession with intent to distribute 
heroin. Upon further investigation, the DEA laboratory 
determined that the pellets Barbosa had swallowed 
contained cocaine base with a purity of 85%, not heroin. 
 
After a jury trial, Barbosa was convicted of possession 
with intent to distribute more than 50 grams (i.e., 882 
grams) of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.SS 841(a)(1) 
and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). He was later sentenced to a twenty- 
year term of imprisonment. Barbosa appeals his conviction 
and sentence, contending that: (1) the District Court should 
have sentenced him based upon the drug he intended to 
bring into the country (heroin), rather that the drug he 
unwittingly, but actually, transported (cocaine base); (2) in 
accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the issue of which 
substance he intended to transport should have been 
submitted to the jury for a factual determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt; (3) if it was proper to sentence him for 
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cocaine base, the court erred in sentencing him to a 
twenty-year mandatory minimum; (4) the District Court 
erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly 
discovered evidence of payments made to government 
informants who testified at trial; and (5) the District Court 
erroneously denied his motions to dismiss the indictment 
based upon "outrageous governmental conduct." 
 
We conclude that there is no merit to any of these claims, 






Barbosa was an ancillary part of a larger DEA undercover 
investigation into South American heroin suppliers who 
were smuggling the drug into the United States. This 
investigation ultimately resulted in the seizure of 75 
kilograms of cocaine in Aruba and the arrest of five 
individuals, including Emilio Medina a/k/a Felix Zorilla. As 
Aruba was a critical point in the smuggling route, the DEA 
had worked with the Aruban Police Department through 
the DEA's Curacao Country Office. 
 
During this investigation, the DEA used three paid 
professional informants: Ramon Disla, Nestora Salcedo, and 
Miguel Morel. Disla had previously been prosecuted for 
illegal re-entry after being deported following a drug 
conviction. While serving his sentence, he and his 
girlfriend, Salcedo, had cooperated with the Government in 
order to have his sentence reduced. Once released, he was 
again deported, but had re-entered the country under a 
cooperation agreement with the DEA. In total, Disla had 
received $14,002 and Salcedo had received $47,000 over 
four years for information, evidence, and expenses in a 
large number of cases. The DEA had also provided housing 
for both Disla and Salcedo. Although they had worked for 
other government agencies as well, Disla and Salcedo had 
derived the vast majority of their income from the DEA. 
Morel, by comparison, had received a total of $108,000 over 
eleven years of work with the DEA but was a minor 
informant in this case. Under its policy, the DEA made 
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payments to informants regardless of their progress on a 
case; these payments were also unconnected to the 
convictions of any specific individuals.1  At trial, the 
Government elicited detailed testimony as to the amounts 
each of the three informants was being paid on this 
particular investigation. 
 
At the time these informants were enlisted, the 
Government possessed information that Zorilla had access 
to a large amount of heroin in Aruba. The DEA knew that 
Zorilla had previously been involved in narcotics activities 
with Disla, and thus directed Disla to contact Zorilla in 
Aruba to negotiate a deal. Disla, however, did not know 
Barbosa when he began this work for the DEA. On June 
10, 1998, during a tape-recorded conversation, Zorilla 
asked Disla if he could obtain a United States passport for 
him to travel internationally but not to enter the United 
States. Later in the conversation, Zorilla gave Disla the 
pager number of his friend, "Luisin," an American citizen 
who had just left Aruba for the United States. According to 
Zorilla, Luisin was a "straight guy," which Disla later 
testified meant someone who could be trusted with drugs. 
Zorilla also stated that he had met Luisin at a restaurant 
in Aruba after not seeing him for some time. Zorilla then 
asked Disla whether he knew of anyone who could be used 
to transport drugs into the United States. 
 
Two days after this conversation, Disla paged Luisin, and 
the two agreed to meet at the La Familia restaurant in New 
York; Luisin turned out to be Barbosa. Disla did not record 
this meeting and did not recall the details of this meeting 
at trial. However, Disla had a second unrecorded meeting 
with Barbosa at the same restaurant in July 1998, this 
time accompanied by Morel, who posed as Disla's partner. 
At this meeting, Barbosa portrayed himself as a drug dealer 
who did not import drugs personally. Rather, Barbosa 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. During the course of Disla's testimony, it was revealed that he had 
been paid $100 by the DEA after concluding a certain day's testimony. 
The defense moved for a mistrial based on this non-disclosure. The 
District Court conducted a hearing at the conclusion of Disla's 
testimony, ruling thereafter that the mid-trial payment was for expenses 
and not payment for testimony. 
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explained the two ways of transporting drugs -- by 
swallowing or by enclosing them in some type of rubber 
device. With respect to the swallowing technique, Barbosa 
asserted that swallowing drugs was not risky because the 
drugs were wrapped in cellophane and then in rubber, and 
that it would cost $10,000 per kilogram, plus an additional 
$5,000 for expenses, to bring in drugs using a swallower. In 
between the two meetings at the restaurant, Disla spoke to 
Barbosa on numerous occasions but similarly did not 
record any of those conversations. 
 
Disla did, however, record a telephone conversation with 
Barbosa on July 7, 1998. During this call, Barbosa told 
Disla that he would talk to Zorilla as soon as Zorilla was 
ready to carry out a drug transaction because, otherwise, 
they would be wasting their time. Barbosa also told Disla 
that the $35,000 per kilogram price (which did not include 
$15,000 for travel and expenses) that Zorilla was charging 
for heroin was too high. Barbosa further explained to Disla 
that the going wholesale price for heroin was $70,000 in 
New York, leaving $20,000 for profit. According to Barbosa, 
a swallower would cost $10 per gram of drugs. 
 
During another recorded telephone conversation on July 
9, 1998, Barbosa informed Disla that he was going to tell 
Zorilla how to package the drugs, that he wanted no more 
than 9 grams of drugs in each pellet, that he wanted the 
pellets narrow so that they could be more easily swallowed, 
and that he was familiar with the type of equipment Zorilla 
used to make the pellets. However, Barbosa had been 
unable to reach Zorilla to relay this information. Barbosa 
said that Zorilla was trying to rush the deal and 
recommended to Disla that they not move hastily as, in any 
case, there were very few heroin customers in Aruba and 
Zorilla would be unable to sell the heroin there. 
 
In this same conversation, Barbosa also explained a 
potential drug deal in which cocaine would be transported 
from Aruba to Israel and heroin would be brought from 
Israel to the United States. Barbosa explained to Disla that, 
in order to bring the heroin from Israel to the United 
States, the swallower would have to stop in between the 
two countries, expel the drugs, and reswallow them. 
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According to Barbosa, Zorilla could get the heroin but did 
not have the money for this transaction. 
 
On July 13, 1998, Disla and Barbosa had another 
recorded telephone conversation. During this call, Barbosa 
told Disla that he had someone to transport the drugs, but 
that this person would be unable to swallow 1,400 grams 
of drugs. Barbosa also explained the nature of the 
transaction between Zorilla and Zorilla's supplier, telling 
Disla that Zorilla's supplier in Aruba initially would only 
give Zorilla 1,000 grams of heroin but would give an 
additional 600 grams after being paid for the first 1,000 
grams. Barbosa also told Disla that he had a steady 
customer who was a Colombian. At the end of the 
conversation, Barbosa told Disla that he would go to Aruba 
to get the drugs from Zorilla, if they were ready, and then 
return to New York City. Disla wanted Barbosa to come 
directly to Philadelphia, or to pick-up Barbosa at the 
airport in New York himself, but Barbosa declined both 
options. 
 
Barbosa and Disla had a second recorded conversation 
later on July 13. During this call, Barbosa insisted on 
making all of his own travel arrangements out of New York. 
Shortly after this call, there was a third recorded 
conversation, during which Barbosa estimated that his 
expenses would be between $1,400 and $1,500. That night, 
Barbosa went to Philadelphia and received $1,600 from 
Disla. 
 
Barbosa traveled to Aruba on July 15, 1998. He spoke to 
Salcedo on the telephone concerning the money Zorilla had 
requested that he bring to Aruba. During a recorded 
telephone conversation the next day, Barbosa told Disla 
that Zorilla had delivered the drugs to him, and that Zorilla 
and his girlfriend had stayed with him while he swallowed 
the drugs. On July 17, Disla and Salcedo picked-up 
Barbosa at JFK Airport in New York. This came as a 
complete surprise to Barbosa, as the two had previously 
agreed to meet elsewhere. Disla testified that he went to the 
airport because he did not trust Barbosa and was afraid 
that Barbosa would abscond with the drugs upon his 
arrival. Disla then drove them to the Hilton Hotel, near the 
Philadelphia airport. During the drive, Barbosa discussed 
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the potential drug deal in Israel and told Disla and Salcedo 
the specific foods and juices he would need to help him 
pass the drugs. Barbosa also told them that he would have 
no problem passing the drugs and that he did not need to 
be in any special place to complete this task. 
 
The DEA had arranged for two adjoining rooms at the 
hotel. Disla's room contained video surveillance equipment, 
which could record activity in Barbosa's room next door. At 
various times, there were four people present -- Barbosa, 
Disla, Salcedo, and Morel. During one of their videotaped 
conversations, Barbosa asked Disla about a drug deal that 
Disla had told him about during their meetings at La 
Familia. Although it was not recorded on videotape, Salcedo 
also had a conversation with Barbosa in which Barbosa 
explained that he knew a lot about swallowing, that he 
trained other people, and that he watched the trainees all 
the time, going so far as to sleep by their side until they 
were ready to swallow drugs on their own. 
 
Barbosa began expelling the drugs almost as soon as 
they had all arrived at the hotel. At one point, he showed 
Morel thirty pellets of drugs that he had expelled, 
explaining that the drugs had not been packaged properly. 
Barbosa finished eliminating the drugs the next morning. 
He asked Disla for a razor to help cut the covering off the 
drugs and peel open the pellets. While he was doing this, 
the agents entered the room and arrested him. 
 
After the arrest, Morel traveled to Aruba to pay for the 
drugs Barbosa had transported, as well as to purchase an 
additional four kilograms of heroin from Zorilla. Morel 
called Zorilla and arranged to meet with him the following 
day. Aruban authorities arrested Zorilla with 75 kilograms 




On August 13, 1998, a grand jury indicted Barbosa on 
one count of possession with intent to distribute more than 
50 grams (i.e., 882 grams) of cocaine base in violation of 21 
U.S.C. SS 841(a) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Before trial, Barbosa 
moved to dismiss the indictment based upon the 
Government's allegedly outrageous conduct. He contended 
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that the Government had orchestrated the entire narcotics 
transaction and had unnecessarily placed his life in danger 
from the ingested drugs. At oral argument before the 
District Court, the Government conceded that swallowing 
drugs and transporting them was dangerous but argued 
that it was not "unusually dangerous" because Barbosa 
knew how to package and swallow drugs, and, in any event, 
there was always risk involved in any drug transaction. The 
District Court denied Barbosa's motion, holding that, in the 
absence of duress or coercion forcing Barbosa to swallow 
the drugs, and considering Barbosa's willing undertaking of 
what was for him not a new experience, the Government's 
conduct did not "shock the conscience of one with a 
reasonably sensitive conscience." 
 
A five-day jury trial began on January 25, 1999. At the 
conclusion of the Government's case, Barbosa again moved 
for dismissal of the indictment on the same ground, 
expanding the motion based upon the trial testimony. The 
District Court again denied the motion, emphasizing that 
Barbosa was willing to engage in such conduct, that there 
was no evidence of duress, and that Barbosa did not 
appear to be apprehensive in the hotel room. 
 
Barbosa then testified in his own defense. He essentially 
interposed an entrapment defense, claiming that he had 
been badgered by Disla into undertaking the smuggling 
from Aruba to Philadelphia. According to Barbosa, it was 
only after repeated prodding from Disla that he had gone to 
Aruba and met with Zorilla for the drug transaction. He 
testified that he had not participated in the packaging of 
the drugs but simply received the pellets from Zorilla. He 
spent the night swallowing the pellets, and Zorilla had 
stayed with him the entire time. Barbosa agreed that he 
was knowledgeable about the price of heroin in Aruba but 
claimed that he knew this information from watching the 
news on television. Finally, Barbosa stated that, although 
he might have made incriminating statements to the 




The District Court instructed the jury on the one count 
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base charged 
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in the indictment. However, the court submitted neither the 
quantity nor identity of the drugs for a factual 
determination. The jury thereafter convicted Barbosa of the 
one count in the indictment. Sentencing then presented 
novel issues for the District Court's resolution. While all 
parties had fully expected that Barbosa was transporting 
heroin, he had unwittingly swallowed a form of cocaine 
base. None of the parties was ever able to determine when 
the "bait and switch" occurred. This mutual mistake of fact 
presented to the District Court the threshold issue under 
the Sentencing Guidelines of whether Barbosa should be 
sentenced for the drug he actually transported or the one 
he reasonably believed he was carrying. 
 
The resolution of this issue has a substantial impact on 
the potential sentence. Assuming a criminal history 
category of III (which neither party disputes), Barbosa's 
sentencing ranges for 882 grams of a controlled substance 
are 121-151 months for heroin and 235-293 months for 
cocaine base.2 However, with a prior felony drug conviction, 
Barbosa is subject to statutory mandatory minimums of ten 
years for heroin and twenty years for cocaine base. See 21 
U.S.C. SS 841(b)(1)(B)(i) (heroin), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (cocaine 
base). 
 
In the District Court, Barbosa maintained that he should 
be held responsible for the intended or foreseeable 
consequences of his criminal conduct under U.S.S.G. 
S 1B1.3. He further attempted to distinguish his case from 
others in which an accused had maintained that he 
thought he was delivering a more moderately punished 
drug than that with which he was caught. Thus, he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Without objection, the District Court used the November 1, 1998 
edition of the Sentencing Guidelines in this case. All sentencing ranges 
were based on base offense levels found in U.S.S.G.S 2D1.1(c). As 
detailed in the Presentence Investigation Report, the Probation Office 
increased Barbosa's offense level by two for obstruction of justice (again 
with no objection), which would have resulted in adjusted ranges of 151- 
188 for heroin and 292-365 for cocaine base. Because the District Court 
imposed a sentence of 240 months, and the record is otherwise silent as 
to this two-level enhancement, we assume that the District Court 
implicitly rejected this recommendation in imposing its ultimate 
sentence. 
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contended that the proper sentencing range was 121-151 
months for heroin, which already accounted for the ten- 
year mandatory minimum applicable to that drug. 
Alternatively, Barbosa argued that, if he were to be held 
responsible for the actual drug transported, he should be 
subject to the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for 
cocaine because the Sentencing Guidelines define"cocaine 
base" only to be crack, relegating all other forms of cocaine 
base (like the 85% pure mixture here) to "cocaine." Notably, 
the federal drug statutes themselves provide no similarly 
delineated definition for "cocaine base." The Probation 
Office concurred with Barbosa's alternative position, 
recommending a sentencing range of 120-121 months for 
cocaine (after imposing the two-level enhancement for 
obstruction of justice).3 
 
On June 8, 1999, after thoroughly canvassing existing 
case law and conducting a sentencing hearing, the District 
Court concluded that Barbosa should be sentenced for the 
drug he actually transported. The court further determined 
that the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of "cocaine base" 
could not override the statute, and thus, applied the 
twenty-year mandatory minimum, resulting in an adjusted 
sentencing range of 240-293 months (again, omitting the 
two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice). The 
District Court ultimately imposed the statutory minimum, 




Barbosa thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal, and we 
issued a briefing and scheduling order. Before the filing 
date of his opening brief, however, Barbosa's counsel 
fortuitously learned that, before the commencement of the 
trial, Disla had been nominated for a $25,000 reward 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. With a criminal history category of III, Barbosa's sentencing range for 
882 grams of cocaine was 78-97 months or 97-121 months after 
imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The 
Probation Office modified these ranges by the statutory mandatory 
minimum of ten years to either 120 months or 120-121 months, 
respectively. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual SS 5G1.1(b), (c) 
(1998). 
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because of his efforts in the overall investigation. Defense 
counsel also learned that Morel had received a $25,000 
reward for his similar efforts, and that Disla had received 
an additional $500 payment only three days after the 
conclusion of the trial. The Government had not previously 
disclosed either the nominations or the payments to the 
defense because it was unaware of them. Defense counsel 
moved to remand the case to the District Court for a new 
trial hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 
based upon newly discovered evidence. We granted the 
motion. 
 
On February 24, 2000, the District Court conducted a 
hearing in which Disla, Morel, and DEA Agents Philip 
Devlin and Michael Machak testified. In October 1998, 
Agent Devlin had nominated both informants for the 
$25,000 reward. Although both Disla and Morel knew that 
they had been nominated for the award, they were not 
aware of the amount of the award, and the DEA had told 
them both that the awards were not guaranteed. The 
nominations were later approved, and both informants 
received $25,000 in April 1999. Disla also received an 
additional $500 payment no more than two days after 
Barbosa's trial. 
 
In a written opinion, the District Court denied Barbosa's 
motion for a new trial. The court found that all testimony 
concerning the payments received by Disla and Morel was 
true and that, while, at the time, the payments had been 
speculative rather than certain, the possibility of payments 
should have been disclosed to the defense. Nonetheless, the 
court went on to find that the payments were not primarily 
for Barbosa's case, but rather for the larger 75-kilogram 
seizure in Aruba; that the payments were for investigations 
and not trials; that the $25,000 payments were not made 
in exchange for any testimony; and that the $500 payment 
after the trial was for information provided during intensive 
trial preparation. The court further found that any 
impeachment value attributable to these payments would 
have been cumulative, would not have been material to the 
issue of entrapment, and that, in view of the overwhelming 
evidence against Barbosa, would not have led to an 
acquittal. 
 
                                11 
 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this case 
under 18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have appellate jurisdiction 




Barbosa initially challenges the propriety of being 
sentenced based upon the cocaine base he unwittingly, but 
actually, transported. The difference is meaningful as the 
sentencing schemes for a particular amount of cocaine base 
are generally heavier than for an equivalent amount of 
heroin, the drug he intended to bring into this country. 
This mutual mistake of fact as to the identity of the drugs 
transported by Barbosa (the Government also believed it 
was heroin) presents us with an issue of first impression in 
this Circuit: whether a defendant should be sentenced for 
the drug he actually transported or for the drug he 




We have previously held that the sentencing judge is 
generally empowered to determine the identity of the 
controlled substance at issue for sentencing purposes. See 
United States v. Lewis, 113 F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 1997); 
see also Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 513-14 
(1998). Consequently, like other federal appellate courts 
that have addressed the instant issue, we would ordinarily 
resolve the tension between these two conflicting theories of 
punishment by characterizing it as a legal determination to 
be made by the sentencing judge. In fact, federal appellate 
courts have uniformly ruled that a defendant should be 
held accountable for the substance he actually imported, 
notwithstanding his reasonable mistake as to drug identity. 
See, e.g., United States v. Strange, 102 F.3d 356, 361 (8th 
Cir. 1996) ("it is certainly within the province of Congress 
to resolve that there is some deterrent value in exposing a 
drug trafficker to liability for the full consequences, both 
expected and unexpected, of his own unlawful behavior"); 
United States v. Salazar, 5 F.3d 445, 446 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(defendant "personally undertook to pass drug-laden 
vehicles through the checkpoint . . . [and thus, he] is 
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responsible for the drugs that came through, even if he did 
not know what drugs they were"); United Sates v. Gomez, 
905 F.2d 1513, 1514-15 (11th Cir. 1990) ("those who, 
acting with deliberate anti-social purpose in mind, become 
involved in illegal drug transactions, assume the risk that 
their actions will subject them to enhanced criminal 
liability"); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
S 1B1.3, cmt. n.2, illus. (a)(1) (1998) (suggesting that a 
defendant is chargeable at sentencing for any narcotic with 
which he was directly involved "regardless of his knowledge 
or lack of knowledge of the actual type or amount of that 
controlled substance"). 
 
For example, in United States v. Valencia-Gonzales, a 
case with facts similar to this one, the defendant believed 
-- and the Government stipulated to his belief-- that he 
was carrying cocaine when, in fact, he was carrying heroin, 
for which he received a longer sentence. The court affirmed 
the sentence, characterizing as "clear" the decision by 
Congress "to make drug dealers assume the risk of what 
kinds and amounts of controlled substances they carry." 
172 F.3d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1999). Similarly, in United 
States v. Obi, the defendant had swallowed heroin, but 
claimed at sentencing that he thought he had swallowed 
cocaine. In affirming the heavier sentence based upon 
heroin, the court stated that "narcotics violators run the 
risk of sentencing enhancements concerning other 
circumstances surrounding the crimes." 947 F.2d 1031, 
1032 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
 
Barbosa contends that these cases are distinguishable 
because the conspiracies in those cases did not involve the 
kind of active participation by government agents that were 
present here. However, like the defendant in Gomez, 
Barbosa: 
 
       knew he was engaging in conduct designed to 
       introduce some illegal substance into the stream of 
       commerce. He was doing this at the behest of two 
       individuals whom, he claimed, he hardly knew. Yet he 
       lacked even the minimal consideration for the public 
       welfare that would have caused him to determine the 
       substance's true identity before agreeing to transport 
       it. One who demonstrates a lack of even this minimal 
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       societal consciousness shows himself to pose an 
       alarming menace to the public safety, because he 
       readily allows himself to become the instrument for 
       others' criminal designs "so long as the price is right." 
 
905 F.2d at 1515. While Barbosa was unable to tell Zorilla 
how the drugs should be packaged, the record does not 
reveal that he was thereafter concerned in any way as to 
how the drugs were presented or even as to the amount or 
identity of the narcotic he would be ingesting. Thus, the 
rationale in Gomez would amply support the enhanced 
penalties dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines, and 
adherence to that rationale would properly penalize 





Notwithstanding the persuasive and uniform decisions of 
the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
Barbosa draws our attention to the Supreme Court's recent 
pronouncement in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and contends that the issue of which substance he 
intended to transport should have been submitted to the 
jury for a factual determination beyond a reasonable doubt. 
According to Barbosa, this error warrants a vacatur of his 
conviction and a new trial. We requested supplemental 
briefing after oral argument on the novel issue of drug 
identity. 
 
The application of Apprendi to this case is a pure 
question of law over which we exercise plenary review. 
United States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 861 (3d Cir. 2000), 
petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3763 (U.S. 2001). 
Apprendi involved the New Jersey hate crime"sentence 
enhancement" scheme, which, in the first instance, allowed 
a jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense 
based upon its finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
unlawfully possessed a prohibited weapon. After a 
subsequent and separate proceeding, the scheme then 
permitted a judge to impose punishment identical to that 
provided for crimes of the first degree in New Jersey. This 
enhanced punishment was available upon the judge's 
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finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendant's "purpose" for unlawfully possessing the weapon 
was "to intimidate" the victim on the basis of a particular 
characteristic the victim possessed. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 
at 491. 
 
The Supreme Court initially canvassed prior case law and 
history to announce that, "[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id. at 490. It then endorsed the concept that, with 
the exception of recidivism, "it is unconstitutional for a 
legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts 
that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a 
criminal defendant is exposed." Id. (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). Under these newly announced 
constitutional rules, the Court struck down the New Jersey 
scheme because the facts necessary to impose the 
enhancement amounted to an intent requirement, which 
the Court concluded "is perhaps as close as one might hope 
to come to a core criminal offense `element.' " Id. at 493. 
 
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), the 
Court first coined the term "sentencing factor" as distinct 
from an element of the crime, the former being something 
not found by a jury but affecting the sentence imposed by 
the judge. See id. at 485-86. By contrast, of course, every 
element of a crime must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S. 
506, 510 (1995). In announcing the rule in Apprendi, the 
Court specifically noted that it was neither overruling 
McMillan nor rendering the term "sentencing factor" devoid 
of meaning. Compare 530 U.S. at 487 n.13 with id. at 494 
n.19. Rather, the Court set forth the proposition that "[t]he 
judge's role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits 
by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the 
jury. Put simply, facts that expose a defendant to a 
punishment greater than that otherwise legally prescribed 
were [for the Sixth Amendment's framers] by definition 
`elements' of a separate legal offense." Id. at 483 n.10. 
Under Apprendi, sentencing factors that support a specific 
sentence within the statutorily prescribed penalty range are 
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still properly submitted to a judge to be found by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See id. Ultimately, a court 
may still consider aggravating and mitigating factors that 
support a specific sentence within the statutorily prescribed 
range when sentencing a defendant, so long as the 
sentence imposed is not greater than the maximum 
statutory penalty for the statutory offense established by 
the jury's verdict. See id. 
 
Here, in its charge to the jury, the District Court read 
aloud the one-count indictment against Barbosa, which 
alleged that he: 
 
       did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to 
       distribute 50 grams or more of a controlled substance. 
       That is, approximately 882 grams of a mixture or 
       substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine 
       base, a Schedule II non-narcotic controlled substance, 
       in violation of Title 21 United States Code Sections 
       841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). 
 
The court further instructed the jury that, in order to prove 
this charge against Barbosa, the Government had to 
establish the following three elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt: "First: That the defendant possessed a controlled 
substance. Second: That the defendant knew that he 
possessed a controlled substance. And Third: That the 
defendant intended to distribute the controlled substance." 
Notwithstanding the fact that the indictment identified 
cocaine base as the controlled substance in this 
prosecution, the court expressly stated that: 
 
       If you find that the material involved in this case is a 
       controlled substance, you need not be concerned with 
       the quantity or the identity of the controlled substance. 
       So long as you find that the defendant knowingly 
       possessed with intent to distribute a controlled 
       substance, the amount and the identity of the 
       controlled substance involved is not important. 
 
The jury subsequently returned a general guilty verdict 
"in the manner and form as [Barbosa] stands indicted." 
However, drug identity was ostensibly not submitted to the 
jury for a factual determination. Hence, we are faced with 
a potential Apprendi issue: whether drug identity was an 
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element of the crime that the District Court should have 
presented to the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt or 
merely a sentencing factor that the court properly found by 
a preponderance of the evidence standard. Should we 
conclude that drug identity is an element of the drug 
trafficking offense, a secondary inquiry is whether the 
defendant's intent (or lack of intent) to traffic in that 
particular drug is yet another fact that the jury was bound 
to find. This latter point is the crux of Barbosa's claim in 
this appeal. 
 
Before beginning our analysis, we note that Barbosa did 
not timely object to the indictment or the jury instructions 
because the Supreme Court decided Apprendi long after he 
was sentenced. Thus, his counsel could hardly have known 
at that time that his client may have had a constitutional 
right to have drug identity determined by a jury. Apprendi 
nonetheless applies retroactively because Barbosa's direct 
appeal was pending at the time the Court decided Apprendi. 
See id. (citing and quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 
314, 328 (1987)). Under these circumstances, Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 52(b) limits our review to one for 
plain error only. Under that doctrine, "before an appellate 
court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be 
(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial 
rights." Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 
(1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The 
deviation from a legal rule is "error," and an error is "plain" 
if it is "clear" or "obvious." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 732-34 (1993). Furthermore, in most cases, an error 
affects substantial rights if it is prejudicial, i.e., "affected 
the outcome of the district court proceedings." Id. at 734. 
We are empowered in our discretion to correct the forfeited 
error, but we should not exercise that discretion unless 
"the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings." Johnson , 520 U.S. at 
467 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, 
unlike a harmless error analysis, the defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the error was prejudicial. See 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Our first step then is to determine 
whether there indeed was an error, or Apprendi  violation. 
 
We begin with a close examination of the federal drug 
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trafficking laws. Congress separated controlled substances 
into five drug schedules, which are updated and 
republished on an annual basis. See 21 U.S.C. SS 802(6), 
812(a). Among other provisions, the drug laws make it 
unlawful "for any person knowingly or intentionally -- (1) to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent 
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance." Id. S 841(a)(1). Thus, on its face, the identity of 
the controlled substance is not an element of the statutory 
offense. Rather, in the immediately following section, 
Congress enumerated numerous potential penalties for 
violating S 841(a), depending upon facts such as drug 
quantity and drug identity. See generally id.  S 841(b). 
Congress also provided for several "catch-all" provisions, all 
of which generally contain no reference to specific drug 
quantity or drug identity, except by schedule number. See, 
e.g., id. S 841(b)(1)(C) ("In the case of a controlled substance 
in schedule I or II . . ."); id. S 841(b)(1)(D) (". . . in the case 
of any controlled substance in schedule III . . ."); id. 
S 841(b)(2) ("In the case of a controlled substance in 
schedule IV . . ."); id. S 841(b)(3) ("In the case of a controlled 
substance in schedule V . . ."). The maximum penalties 
under these "catch-all" provisions range from one year 
(schedule V) to twenty years (schedules I and II). If the 
defendant has a prior felony drug conviction, the maximum 
penalties are enhanced to a range of two years to thirty 
years, respectively.4 Thus, because a defendant would be 
exposed to greater punishment depending upon a factual 
finding regarding the identity of the controlled substance, it 
is conceivable, under the teachings of Apprendi , that drug 
identity is an element of a S 841(a) offense, and therefore, 
generally must be submitted to the jury and found beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
 
Here, the District Court read to the jury the contents of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Under some circumstances, the maximum penalty under a given 
combination of quantity and identity of a controlled substance can make 
a defendant eligible for a life sentence. See , e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. 
S 841(b)(1)(A). Additionally, under 21 U.S.C.S 841 (b)(1)(B), if a 
defendant 
has previously committed a felony drug offense, other combinations of 
quantity and identity of a controlled substance would make him eligible 
for a life sentence as well. 
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the indictment, which explicitly alleged cocaine base as the 
controlled substance at issue. But immediately thereafter, 
the court expressly circumscribed the jury's deliberations 
by admonishing it from considering either the amount or 
identity of the controlled substance. Thus, the jury only 
conclusively found that Barbosa trafficked in a controlled 
substance, without any finding as to a particular controlled 
substance or the amount at issue. 
 
That said, Barbosa himself does not challenge drug 
quantity on this appeal, and thus, in light of this waiver, we 
will accept the amount presented at trial, which was 882 
grams. See Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("When an issue is either not set forth in the statement of 
issues presented or not pursued in the argument section of 
the brief, the appellant has abandoned and waived that 
issue on appeal.") (citations omitted); But, as the "catch-all" 
provisions above demonstrate, Congress did not enact a 
general provision for situations in which drug quantity is 
known but drug identity is not. Thus, under the facts found 
by the jury, we cannot unequivocally determine which of 
the "catch-all" provisions to invoke against Barbosa. Only 
under the "catch-all" provision for a schedule I or II 
controlled substance would Barbosa's twenty-year sentence 
be within the prescribed statutory maximum. See  21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(C) (authorizing maximum of twenty years; thirty 
years with prior felony drug conviction). Under the other 
three provisions, his sentence far exceeds the maximum 
permitted under the statute. See 21 U.S.C.SS 841(b)(1)(D), 
(b)(2), (b)(3). We would reach the same outcome even if we 
were to include any enhancement for Barbosa's prior felony 
drug conviction. 
 
In the face of this ambiguity, we would apply the rule of 
lenity to Barbosa (notwithstanding his failure to raise this 
issue) and conclude that an Apprendi violation has been 
established. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 
619, n.17 (1994) (rule of lenity requires that "ambiguous 
criminal statute[s] . . . be construed in favor of the 
accused"). The rule of lenity is applicable when there is a 
"grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and 
structure of the [statute]." Huddleston v. United States, 415 
U.S. 814, 831 (1974). The ambiguity must be such that, 
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even after a court has " `seize[d] every thing from which aid 
can be derived,' " it is still "left with an ambiguous statute." 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (quoting 
United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805)). "The 
rule [of lenity] comes into operation at the end of the 
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at 
the beginning as an overriding consideration of being 
lenient to wrongdoers." Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 
587, 596 (1961). Thus, except for S 841(b)(1)(C) and its 
thirty-year statutory maximum, Barbosa can establish an 
Apprendi violation because the identity of the controlled 
substance is a fact that increased his penalty beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximums in the other three penalty 
provisions. Cf. United States v. Vazquez, 2001 WL 1188250, 
*1 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding Apprendi violation where the 
district court sentenced the defendant to a term in excess 
of the default statutory maximum for powder cocaine based 
upon its own factual finding of drug quantity). 
 
In an attempt to sidestep this result, the Government 
argues in its brief that, if the quantity of drugs were to be 
disregarded, Barbosa would be subject to a statutory 
maximum of thirty years, irrespective of whether the drug 
was heroin or cocaine base (the only controlled substances 
presented to the jury through the evidence at trial), because 
both heroin and cocaine base are schedule I or II controlled 
substances. See 21 U.S.C. SS 802(6), 812 (Schedules I(b)(10) 
and II(a)(4)), 841(b)(1)(C). Thus, according to the 
Government, Barbosa's twenty-year sentence is less than 
the statutory maximum, rendering Apprendi inapplicable. 
Alternatively, in its letter brief following oral argument, the 
Government relies upon another line of cases that permit 
us to infer facts from the jury's verdict. See, e.g., United 
States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding 
that, in convicting the defendant, the jury implicitly rejected 
as false the defendant's exculpatory testimony, thus laying 
the groundwork for an obstruction of justice enhancement 
at sentencing). According to the Government, the fact that 
Barbosa possessed cocaine base was "necessarily and 
finally decided" by the jury in convicting him of the 
substantive offense, and thus, there can be no question 
that the jury made a finding that he possessed cocaine 
base. 
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We cannot countenance either of the Government's lines 
of analysis to determine whether an Apprendi violation has 
occurred because it amounts to an ill-advised effort to 
define away the applicability of Apprendi to this case. The 
Government fails to appreciate that, because the identity of 
the drug was not submitted to the jury, we cannot simply 
assume that only schedule I and II controlled substances 
are implicated merely because the evidence was so 
constrained. Apprendi compels us to focus on the 
permissible sentences authorized by the jury's verdict, 
which, in this case, contained no factual finding as to drug 
identity. Moreover, with respect to its argument pertaining 
to S 841(b)(1)(C), the Government only further complicates 
the issue by introducing a new variable and urging us to 
disregard the quantity of drugs. Both parties agree that 
Barbosa intended to import approximately one kilogram of 
a controlled substance, and no party disputes the 882- 
gram amount that was ultimately seized by the DEA agents. 
As we will make apparent, however, where the 
Government's arguments have merit is in their applicability 
to the substantial rights inquiry of the plain error analysis. 
 
We hold that, under the circumstances of this case, an 
Apprendi violation has occurred and that it was plain. The 
jury convicted Barbosa without having the issue of drug 
identity submitted for its consideration. Barbosa's twenty- 
year sentence far exceeded the statutory maximums under 
the potentially applicable "catch-all" provisions (after 
judicial application of the rule of lenity) because of the 
District Court's drug identity determination. Cf. Vazquez, 
2001 WL 1188250, at **4-5 (holding that defendant had 
established a plain Apprendi violation with respect to drug 
quantity). Other federal appellate courts have similarly 
concluded that the failure to submit drug identity for a jury 
determination may violate Apprendi. See, e.g., Horton v. 
United States, 244 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Robinson, 250 F.3d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 2001); cf. 
United States v. Keith, No. 00-4820, 2001 WL 575143, at *1 
(4th Cir. May 29, 2001) (unpublished). 
 
Our prior jurisprudence on this point, however, is to the 
contrary. Before Apprendi, we had held that drug identity 
under S 841(a) was merely a sentencing factor to be 
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determined by the court, not an element of the offense 
subject to a jury finding. See United States v. Lewis, 113 
F.3d 487, 490 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that an indictment 
need not identify the controlled substance at issue because 
drug identity is a factor for sentencing and not an element 
of the offense); cf. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 
205-06 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court's drug 
identity finding was not clearly erroneous), cert. denied sub 
nom. Sydnor v. United States, 529 U.S. 1030 (2000). 
Therefore, we acknowledge that Apprendi has eroded the 
precedential value of our prior decisions. However, we do 
not overrule them completely because, even after Apprendi, 
drug identity will not always be an element of aS 841(a) 
offense because of the inherent ambiguity in choosing 
amongst several potentially applicable "catch-all" 
provisions. Under Apprendi, drug identity must be treated 
as an element only when it results in a sentence beyond 
the relevant statutory maximum. Apprendi therefore does 
not necessarily preclude a sentencing judge from 
determining the drug identity involved in a S 841 offense or 
considering it as relevant conduct under the Sentencing 
Guidelines using a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
So long as the resulting, and possibly enhanced, sentence 
is below the statutory maximum authorized by the jury's 
factual findings, no Apprendi problem exists and drug 
identity need not be treated as an element of the offense. 
See, e.g., Vazquez, 2001 WL 1188250, at **3-7 (holding 
that, post-Apprendi, drug quantity is only an element of a 
S 841 offense when a defendant is sentenced above the 
default statutory maximum, thus only overruling prior 
decisions to the extent that they establish that drug 
quantity is never an element).5 Specifically, drug identity 
would not be an element in those cases where the sentence 
imposed is below the lowest "catch-all" maximum of one 
year found in S 841(b)(3), which corresponds to Zone A and 
Zone B in the Sentencing Table. See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual ch.5, pt. A (1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It should be noted that while Chief Judge Becker joins the majority in 
this case, he had not joined in the portion of Vazquez relevant here, but 
rather wrote separately, opining that drug quantity and identity are 
always elements, even when the sentence is below the maximum. 
 





The foregoing conclusion gives us pause to consider, as 
a secondary matter, whether Barbosa's lack of intent to 
traffic in cocaine base, brought about because of his 
mistake of fact concerning drug identity, would be yet 
another fact that the jury was bound to find under the 
teachings of Apprendi. We understand Barbosa to be 
arguing that, once the application of Apprendi  makes drug 
identity an element of the offense, a defendant must also 
have knowledge of the precise controlled substance at issue 
before he can be convicted under S 841(a)(1). Here, both 
Barbosa and the Government agree that Barbosa's 
knowledge and intent related only to heroin. Thus, the 
Government introduced no evidence of Barbosa's knowledge 
or intent concerning cocaine base because none existed. On 
that basis, according to Barbosa, his conviction cannot 
stand because the jury did not find that he knowingly 
possessed cocaine base and, in fact, could not have made 
such a finding based upon the evidence adduced at trial. 
Indeed, Barbosa presents us with the perplexing problem of 
a defendant who was found to have possessed cocaine base 
but with the intent to distribute heroin. The resolution of 
this inquiry turns once again upon statutory construction. 
 
In relevant part, the statutory proscription reads:". . . it 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally 
-- (1) to . . . possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, 
or dispense, a controlled substance . . . ." 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(a)(1). Under a plain reading of this statute, if the 
identity of the controlled substance creates separate legal 
offenses under an Apprendi analysis, then the issue for this 
Court is whether the defendant's mens rea concerning that 
particular controlled substance must also be construed as 
an inherent part of each offense as well. 
 
To act "knowingly" is to act with "knowledge of the facts 
that constitute the offense" but not necessarily with 
knowledge that the facts amount to illegal conduct, unless 
the statute indicates otherwise. Bryan v. United States, 524 
U.S. 184, 193 (1998). A contrary interpretation would be 
tantamount to compelling the Government to disprove an 
ignorance of the law defense. See, e.g., United States v. 
Cain, 130 F.3d 381, 384 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, "to 
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commit an act intentionally is to do so deliberately and not 
by accident." United States v. Fuller, 162 F.3d 256, 260 (4th 
Cir. 1998). 
 
Thus, under the mens rea requirement, the Government 
must prove the defendant's awareness that he engaged in 
one or more of the active verbs in that provision: 
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense. It is not a 
requirement, however, that the defendant have specifically 
intended to violate the statute in order to be found guilty. 
Additionally, it is well settled that the Government must 
show that the defendant knew that the substance in which 
he trafficked was a controlled substance. See, e.g., United 
States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 959 (3d Cir. 1994); cf. United 
States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2000) (similarly 
analyzing analogous mens rea requirement in felon-in- 
possession firearm statute). 
 
We believe that the structure of the drug statutes and the 
policies behind them show that the Government's mens rea 
burden has not changed with the advent of Apprendi. 
Under Apprendi, drug identity may now be a separately 
delineated element of the offense, but that conclusion alone 
does not lead to the inevitable result that the Government 
must prove the defendant's knowledge of that fact. The 
drug statutes require specific knowledge or intent as to a 
general category of unlawful items. The specific unlawful 
items, however, are found in the penalty section of the 
scheme. Thus, the structure and plain text of S 841 affords 
no support for a requirement that the Government must 
prove more than the defendant's knowledge that he was 
trafficking in a controlled substance. See United States v. 
Lewis, 113 F.3d 487, 491 (3d Cir. 1997) ("While Congress 
could have enacted separate statutes criminalizing the 
distribution of particular controlled substances, it did not 
do so. Instead, it characterized the determination of the 
identity and the weight of the controlled substance as 
penalty factors in section 841(b). We must honor that 
approach."). Moreover, we see no reason, consistent with 
Congress' overall intent in promulgating the drug laws, to 
extend the mens rea requirement to the precise controlled 
substance at issue, even in the face of having concluded 
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that it may be an element of the crime. Barbosa's 
awareness that he was trafficking in what he believed was 
a controlled substance, albeit a different type for which he 
was arrested, is all that is required to satisfy the mens rea 
portion of the substantive offense. 
 
We appreciate the somewhat anomalous result in having 
provided more specificity to an existing element in 
S 841(a)(1) to which the mens rea requirement applies, 
while, at the same time, refusing to apply that requirement 
to the newly specified element. But to construe the statute 
otherwise would entail making drastic revisions to a 
statutory scheme, which, in the first instance, lies in the 
hands of Congress. By concluding that drug identity may 
be an element of the offense, we are not rewriting 
S 841(a)(1) so as to eliminate any of the text. We are only 
making the specific controlled substance an additional 
element that may have to be submitted to the jury for a 
factual finding beyond a reasonable doubt, if the facts 
warrant it. Otherwise, we would in essence be striking the 
term "controlled substance" from the text ofS 841(a)(1). 
Thus, we leave undisturbed our jurisprudence with respect 
to the mens rea requirement, which only requires the 
Government to prove the defendant's knowledge that he 
was trafficking in a controlled substance. 
 
Barbosa alternatively urges us to adopt the evidentiary 
mechanism suggested by Judge Weinstein in United States 
v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). In 
that case, Judge Weinstein proposed a burden-shifting 
mechanism for mistake of fact cases. In brief, he held that 
the sentencing court should presume that the defendant 
was aware of the type of narcotics he was carrying but 
should afford him the opportunity to rebut this 
presumption by introducing evidence at the sentencing 
phase. See id. at 531-32. However creative and facially 
palatable Judge Weinstein's solution may appear, we 
decline to adopt such a mechanism as the law in this 
Circuit for two main reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that 
Judge Weinstein's methodology survives the new 
constitutional rule announced in Apprendi. Indeed, it would 
be unwise for us to craft an evidentiary rule to supplant the 
teachings of a Supreme Court case that is directly on point. 
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And second, as we have discussed above, Judge Weinstein 
appears to be the lone voice of dissent against a backdrop 
of uniformity in the federal courts before the advent of 
Apprendi. We decline Barbosa's request to sail in such 
uncharted waters. 
 
Accordingly, we now formally adopt the uniform and 
persuasive reasoning of pre-Apprendi federal appellate 
authority, which held essentially that a defendant who is in 
actual possession of a particular controlled substance, 
while intending to distribute another, may be punished for 
the drug with which he is found to be in possession. See, 
e.g., United States v. Valencia-Gonzales, 172 F.3d 344, 345 
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Strange, 102 F.3d 356, 361 
(8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Salazar, 5 F.3d 445, 446 
(9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Obi, 947 F.2d 1031, 1032 
(2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam); United Sates v. Gomez, 905 F.2d 




Having concluded that an Apprendi violation has 
occurred with respect to drug identity, we now turn to the 
substantial rights inquiry under the plain error analysis. As 
we explained in Vazquez, we rely upon Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and Johnson v. United States, 
520 U.S. 461 (1997), in conducting this inquiry because 
both decisions concerned the failure of the trial court to 
instruct the jury as to an element of the offense charged. 
See Vazquez, 2001 WL 1188250, WL, at **5-8 . As the 
Supreme Court made clear in Neder, "an instruction that 
omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render 
a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable 
vehicle for determining guilt or innocence." 527 U.S. at 9. 
Despite the occurrence of an Apprendi violation here, 
because drug identity was not submitted to the jury, under 
Neder, "the question remains whether [Barbosa's] 
conviction can stand because the error was harmless." Id. 
at 15. The test for whether a constitutional error is 
harmless "is whether it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.' " Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). That is, we must limit our inquiry to 
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"whether the record contains evidence that could rationally 
lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted 
element." Id. at 19. "If, at the end of the examination, [we] 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
verdict would have been the same absent the error-- for 
example, where the defendant contested the omitted 
element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary 
finding -- [we] should not find the error harmless." Id. 
 
Under this standard, Barbosa cannot show that the error 
affected his substantial rights. The evidence at trial 
established indisputably, and certainly beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Barbosa possessed with the intent to distribute 
882 grams of a controlled substance and that this 
controlled substance was cocaine base. The Government 
presented three government informants, numerous tape- 
recorded conversations, and Barbosa's own confession all 
demonstrating that Barbosa was a drug smuggler who 
made contact with a supplier in Aruba to transport 
approximately one kilogram of a controlled substance into 
the United States through swallowing. For his part, 
Barbosa did not contest that he had violated S 841(a)(1), 
but rather, only interposed an entrapment defense. 
 
Before trial, Barbosa and the Government believed the 
drug at issue to be heroin. But later chemical analysis 
revealed the controlled substance to be cocaine base with a 
purity of 85%. Indeed, cocaine base and heroin were the 
only controlled substances presented to the jury through 
the evidence at trial, the former through the testimony of 
the DEA forensic chemist. Nonetheless, we may confidently 
infer that the jury, in convicting Barbosa and rejecting the 
entrapment defense, necessarily found the controlled 
substance to be cocaine base. While evidence of heroin was 
presented by the testimony, it is undisputed that Barbosa 
was arrested while in possession of cocaine base, the very 
same controlled substance he had swallowed in Aruba two 
days earlier. We are convinced that a properly instructed 
jury would have come to no other conclusion than that the 
controlled substance at issue in this prosecution was 
cocaine base. 
 
We need not even make that inference, however, because 
Barbosa himself only raises the applicability of the 
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provisions for heroin and cocaine base. These provisions 
mandate a term of imprisonment of five to forty years for 
882 grams of heroin and ten years to life for an equivalent 
amount of cocaine base. Because Barbosa has a prior 
felony drug conviction (a fact that need not have been 
submitted to the jury under Apprendi), the same statutory 
provisions also set forth enhanced punishments of ten 
years to life for heroin and twenty years to life for cocaine 
base. Compare 21 U.S.C. S 841(b)(1)(B)(i) with id. 
S 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, irrespective of which of the two 
drugs the jury could have found, Barbosa's twenty-year 
sentence falls well below the prescribed statutory maximum 
of life for either heroin or cocaine base. Accordingly, we 
conclude that Barbosa's substantial rights were not 
affected. See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 267 
n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (teachings of Apprendi 
irrelevant where application of Sentencing Guidelines did 
not implicate a fact that would increase the penalty of 
crime beyond statutory maximum), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 
1114 (2001); United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 235 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2000) (Apprendi does not apply where statutory 
maximum is life imprisonment), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 
2015 (2001). 
 
Even if Barbosa could somehow satisfy the third plain 
error prong, the Apprendi violation here did not seriously 
affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. On this point, we rely on the Supreme Court's 
decision in Johnson, which, like Neder , addressed a failure 
to submit an element for a jury's determination but did so 
in the context of the fourth plain error prong. In Johnson, 
the Supreme Court held that, when evidence of an element 
wrongly taken from a jury "overwhelming[ly]" supports the 
trial court's finding with regard to that element,"there is no 
basis for concluding that the error `seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings,' " and therefore plain error relief is 
unavailable. 520 U.S. at 470. 
 
In this case, we think it clear that the evidence we recited 
above in the context of the third plain error prong 
constitutes overwhelming evidence that Barbosa possessed 
with the intent to distribute 882 grams of a controlled 
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substance and that the controlled substance was cocaine 
base. Because his sentence would not have been any 
different, there is no reasonable basis upon which to 
conclude that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings were seriously affected. See United 
States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 825-26 (7th Cir. 2000), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 00-9633 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2001); 
United States v. Keeling, 235 F.3d 533, 539-40 (10th Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2575 (2001); United States v. 
Swatzie, 228 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 2600 (2001). Accordingly, we hold that, 
while Barbosa's sentence violated Apprendi, the error did 
not affect his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings, and thus, we 
uphold his twenty-year sentence. Cf. Vazquez, 2001 WL 
1188250, at *10 (declining to notice the Apprendi violation 
under the fourth plain error prong because "of the 
undisputed evidence of drug quantity attributable to[the 
defendant] and our determination that his sentence did not 
exceed the statutory maximum for the cocaine amount 
introduced at trial"). Under these facts, the District Court 
properly sentenced Barbosa based upon the controlled 





Our inquiry is not complete because of another wrinkle in 
the drug sentencing schemes. Although we have concluded 
that Barbosa should be sentenced based upon cocaine base 
-- the drug he actually transported -- Barbosa argues that 
this does not automatically mean that his sentence should 
be at least the twenty-year mandatory minimum for that 
drug. Rather, he contends that he should be subject to the 
ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for cocaine 
because: (1) there was no dispute that the substance he 
transported was not crack, and (2) the Sentencing 
Guidelines utilize the cocaine guideline for penalizing all 
forms of cocaine base other than crack, reserving the 
cocaine base penalties solely for crack. Again, the potential 
sentencing ranges are 240-293 months for cocaine base 
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and 120 months for cocaine. This challenge raises yet 
another issue of first impression in this Circuit, one that we 
have expressly reserved deciding at least twice. See United 
States v. Bennett, 100 F.3d 1105, 1111 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. James, 78 F.3d 851, 858 (3d Cir. 1996). 
We exercise plenary review over legal questions involving 
the proper interpretation and application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1100 (2001). 
 
We begin with a brief explanation of the chemistry of 
cocaine and cocaine base, which is now established in the 
case law and which will provide some background for the 
ensuing discussion. The chemical compound with the 
scientific formula C17H21NO4 is found naturally in the coca 
leaf. It is referred to chemically as "cocaine base" because 
it reacts with acids to produce a salt. The compound can be 
extracted from the coca leaf in the form of a paste. When 
the paste derived from the coca leaf is dissolved in 
hydrochloric acid (HCl) and water (H2O), it creates a salt 
called cocaine hydrochloride, C17H22ClNO4, whichis 
commonly known as powder cocaine or cocaine salt. This is 
the form of the drug that is usually processed for 
importation into the United States. Powder cocaine is 
water-soluble and may be ingested, snorted, or dissolved in 
a liquid and injected, but it cannot be smoked because it 
decomposes at the same temperature at which it 
evaporates. There are, however, several ways in which to 
convert powder cocaine back into a base. The most 
common method is to dissolve the powder in water (H 2O) 
and sodium bicarbonate or baking soda (NaHCO3), and 
then to boil the mixture until it solidifies and dries. When 
dried, the resulting substance, commonly called"crack" or 
"crack cocaine," can be smoked and has the same chemical 
formula as the naturally occurring cocaine base. Other 
forms of cocaine base can be derived from powder cocaine 
using other chemical agents. The chemical compound C 17H21 
NO4, either in nature or upon conversion from cocaine 
hydrochloride, is a base, and its distinct physical forms, 
such as coca paste and crack, are chemically 
indistinguishable. See United States v. Robinson , 144 F.3d 
104, 108 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Sloan , 97 F.3d 
1378, 1381-82 (11th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. 
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Barbosa, 51 F. Supp. 2d 597, 601 (E.D. Pa. 1999); U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual S 2D1.1(c), Note (D) to Drug 
Quantity Table (1998) (" `Crack' is the street name for a 
form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing 
cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually 
appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form."). 
 
At trial, the Government proved that Barbosa transported 
pellets containing cocaine base with a purity of 85% and 
conceded that the pellets did not contain crack. Under the 
Sentencing Guidelines applicable at the time of Barbosa's 
sentencing hearing, "cocaine base" had to be"crack" for a 
defendant to be sentenced to the higher guideline for 
cocaine base. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
S 2D1.1(c), Note (D) to Drug Quantity Table (1998) 
(" `Cocaine base,' for purposes of this guideline, means 
`crack.' "). This specific definition was promulgated by the 
Sentencing Commission through an amendment to the 
Sentencing Guidelines on November 1, 1993 and was 
subsequently approved by Congress. See U.S. Sentencing 
Comm'n, Notice, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 
for United States Courts, 58 Fed. Reg. 27148, 27156 (May 
6, 1993) (proposing amendment and explaining that forms 
of "cocaine base" other than "crack," such as coca paste, 
will be treated as "cocaine" even though they are, 
scientifically, forms of "cocaine base"); see also U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual supp. app. C, amend. 487 
(1998). Because Barbosa transported a form of cocaine 
base different from crack, the Probation Office initially 
determined that the cocaine guidelines would provide for an 
imprisonment range of between 97 to 121 months (after 
imposing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of 
justice). However, due to Barbosa's prior felony drug 
conviction, Probation also subjected him to a statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years. See 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (mandatory minimum for 882 grams of 
cocaine). This adjusted his applicable sentencing range to 
120-121 months or simply 120 months without the 
obstruction of justice enhancement. See U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual SS 5G1.1(b), (c) (1998). 
 
Notably, Congress itself did not define "cocaine base" as 
specifically as did the Sentencing Commission; in fact, 
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Congress chose to omit any definition of "cocaine base" 
within the drug statutes. Moreover, to this day, even after 
the approval of the Commission's amendment in November 
1993, Congress has not seen fit to adopt any definition or 
similar delineation of "cocaine base," contrary or otherwise. 
Thus, we must address what "cocaine base" means under 
the drug statutes when applying the statutory mandatory 
minimum sentences. Or said more precisely, the issue is 
whether the Sentencing Commission's definition of"cocaine 
base" as meaning only the equivalent of crack should be 
adopted as the statutory meaning of that drug under 21 
U.S.C. S 841(b)(1). The resolution of this issue is significant 
because, should we decline to restrict the definition of 
cocaine base under the statute in the manner prescribed by 
the Sentencing Commission, Barbosa would be subject to a 
mandatory minimum of twenty years, or 240 months, 
rather than 120 to 121 months. See 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (mandatory minimum for 882 grams of 
cocaine base and a prior felony drug conviction). 
 
Two circuits have reached opposite conclusions on this 
issue, initially basing their determinations on differing 
conceptions of statutory construction and ultimately finding 
themselves constrained by principles of stare decisis. The 
Second Circuit applied the broader definition of cocaine 
base to all forms of cocaine base, including crack. As the 
court stated in United States v. Jackson: 
 
       It is apparent that Congress in imposing the enhanced 
       penalties was concerned with the scourge of "crack." 
       While we believe that Congress contemplated that 
       "cocaine base" would include cocaine in the form 
       commonly referred to as "crack" or "rock" cocaine, 
       Congress neither limited the term to that form in the 
       plain language of the statute nor demonstrated an 
       intent to do so in the statute's legislative history. 
       Congress used the chemical term "cocaine base" 
       without explanation or limitation. 
 
968 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1992). In a later case addressing 
the Sentencing Commission's 1993 amendment, the Second 
Circuit held that the amendment could not override the 
court's earlier interpretation of the drug statute in Jackson 
as encompassing all forms of cocaine base, in the absence 
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of new guidance from Congress. See United States v. 
Palacio, 4 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1993). Thus, while the 
court concluded that "the sentencing range under the 
Guidelines for defendants who possess cocaine base that is 
not crack will be significantly lowered" and deemed "the 
Commission's interpretation of section 2D1.1 in the 
amended commentary . . . authoritative with respect to the 
Guidelines," it doubted what effect, if any, that 
interpretation would have in construing the substantive 
meaning of the term in the criminal statute. Id.  
 
By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit restricted the definition 
of cocaine base to crack only, in accordance with the 
Sentencing Commission's amendment. Initially, in United 
States v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit had held that the 
term "cocaine base," as used in S 2D1.1 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, was not limited to crack but included all forms 
of cocaine base according to the term's scientific meaning. 
See 980 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (11th Cir. 1992). But two 
years later, the Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. 
Munoz-Realpe that the statutory definition of"cocaine base" 
had been amended by the Sentencing Commission because 
Congress had permitted the amendment to become effective 
with no change, thereby implicitly adopting the definition. 
See 21 F.3d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1994). In addressing its 
contrary result in Rodriguez, the court stated: 
 
       We believe that the precedential force of our Rodriguez 
       ruling has been eroded by subsequent Congressional 
       action. . . . By allowing the amendment to take effect, 
       Congress has given its imprimatur to the new 
       definition of "cocaine base"; Congress indicated that it 
       intends the term "cocaine base" to include only crack 




In imposing the higher mandatory minimum sentence 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In passing, we note that, although equally not binding on our 
disposition, the Probation Office adopted the Munoz-Realpe analysis in 
rejecting an objection by the Government to the Presentence 
Investigation Report on the issue of which mandatory minimum to apply 
in sentencing Barbosa. 
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upon Barbosa for cocaine base, the District Court 
concluded that the reasoning of Munoz-Realpe could not 
survive the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Neal v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). In Neal , the Court 
rejected a claim that the Sentencing Commission's revision 
of S 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines required 
reconsideration of the Court's prior interpretation of a 
related statutory provision. See id. at 288-96. Specifically, 
the Court held that the Sentencing Commission's revised 
definition of "mixture or substance" could not overturn the 
Court's prior interpretation of those terms in an earlier 
case, Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-68 
(1991). The Court explained that, "[o]nce we have 
determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling 
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an 
agency's later interpretation of the statute against that 
settled law." Id. at 295. 
 
While this analysis echoes the reasoning of the Second 
Circuit in Palacio because it too rested on the fundamental 
principle of stare decisis, it actually says nothing with 
respect to the proper level of deference accorded to the 
Sentencing Commission's interpretation. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged so. See id.  ("In 
these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any 
deference is owed the Commission in order to reject its 
alleged contrary interpretation."). As we will make apparent, 
we also need not opine on this thorny issue. All we 
understand Neal to stand for is the narrow and now 
unobjectionable proposition that a court must adhere to its 
prior decisions interpreting an act of Congress, even in the 
face of a later, contrary interpretation or definition issued 
by the Sentencing Commission. It does not address 
situations where the court has not previously determined a 
particular statutory construction to which the 
Commission's interpretation arguably applies. 
 
Thus, as a threshold matter, we examine our precedent 
to see if we have previously opined on the construction of 
the term "cocaine base" under the statute. We have not 
expressly done so. In United States v. Roberson , we noted, 
for the first time, that, "[p]rior to 1993, the Sentencing 
Guidelines had not defined the term `cocaine base' in 
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S 2D1.1(c), and no court of appeals had held that this term 
referred only to `crack' and not to other forms of cocaine 
base." 194 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing cases). 
Interestingly, the only case cited in that opinion from this 
Circuit was United States v. Jones, in which one member of 
this panel concluded that "crack" is a "cocaine base," and 
additionally that, because the Sentencing Guidelines had a 
reasonable basis to differentiate between cocaine base and 
cocaine salt, both the drug statute and the Guidelines were 
not void for vagueness. See 979 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 
1992). We further held in Roberson that the Commission's 
1993 amendment overruled our prior constructions of 
S 2D1.1(c), such as in Jones, and that this change was 
substantive. See Roberson, 194 F.3d at 417. Significantly, 
however, we did not interpret the amendment as having 
foreclosed any particular construction of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1), the statute at issue in this appeal. 
 
Next, in United States v. James, we stated that "[w]e find 
the Munoz-Realpe analysis to be persuasive." 78 F.3d 851, 
858 (3d Cir. 1996). However, we only utilized the Eleventh 
Circuit's reasoning to require the Government to prove, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that the form of cocaine 
base sold by the defendant was actually crack before 
imposing the enhanced sentence for crack under the 
Guidelines. See id. at 857-58. Once again, we did not reach 
the question of statutory construction under 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1), expressly declining to address the question. See 
id. at 858. 
 
Hence, we conclude that we are neither constrained by 
stare decisis in the same way as were the Second Circuit in 
Palacio and the Supreme Court in Neal, nor required to 
address the prospective effect of the intervening 
amendment on a prior decision of this Court as did the 
Eleventh Circuit in Munoz-Realpe. The limited proposition 
established in Neal then is inapplicable to our disposition of 
the issue because we must construe the statute for the first 
time, unencumbered by precedent. As we stated earlier, we 
have had neither the occasion nor the need to opine 
expressly on the analytical basis for the Munoz-Realpe 
decision until now. 
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Upon careful consideration of the different analytical 
techniques employed by the Second and Eleventh Circuits, 
we conclude that the reasoning of the Second Circuit in 
Jackson and Palacio is more consonant with our 
understanding of the power of the Sentencing Commission 
to amend, in any way, the substantive meaning of a 
criminal statute. Because of the Commission's amendment, 
sentences imposed under the Guidelines for defendants 
who possess crack will be higher than for defendants who 
possess other forms of cocaine base. This result necessarily 
follows because the Sentencing Commission's promulgation 
of amendments to its own Guidelines, once approved by 
and stamped with the imprimatur of Congress, is binding 
on sentencing courts. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 
U.S. 361, 391 (1989) ("the Guidelines bind judges and 
courts in the exercise of their uncontested responsibility to 
pass sentence in criminal cases"); see also  28 U.S.C. 
S 994(p) (providing that Commission's amendments to 
Guidelines automatically become effective within prescribed 
time period absent modification or disapproval by 
Congress). The Commission's amendments to the Guideline 
commentaries are equally binding on sentencing courts. 
See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993) 
("Amended commentary is binding on the federal courts 
even though it is not reviewed by Congress, and prior 
judicial constructions of a particular guideline cannot 
prevent the Commission from adopting a conflicting 
interpretation that satisfies the standard we set forth 
today."). It is in this sense that we made the following 
statement in United States v. Holman: "In 1993, Congress 
amended Guideline S 2D1.1 to explain that`cocaine base,' 
for the purposes of that guideline, meant `crack.' " 168 F.3d 
655, 658 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 
By contrast, sentences imposed under the sentencing 
provisions of criminal statutes, specifically the mandatory 
minimum sentences, cannot be similarly affected simply 
because of Congress' silent approval of the Commission's 
amendment. At least two reasons support this conclusion. 
First, the Commission lacks the power to do so. Congress 
created the Sentencing Commission as an independent 
agency within the Article III Judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 991(a). The purposes of the Sentencing Commission are 
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twofold: (1) "establish sentencing policies and practices for 
the Federal criminal justice system"; and (2)"develop 
means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, 
penal, and correctional practices are effective in meeting 
the purposes of sentencing." Id. S 991(b). In carrying out 
these purposes, Congress empowered the Commission to 
"establish general policies and promulgate such rules and 
regulations for the Commission as are necessary." Id. 
S 995(a)(1). However, nowhere in Title 28, Chapter 58 of the 
United States Code did Congress delegate to the 
Commission the power, directly or indirectly, to promulgate 
amendments to the statutory code itself. See Mistretta, 488 
U.S. at 396 (stating that the Guidelines "do not . . . vest in 
the Judicial Branch the legislative responsibility for 
establishing minimum and maximum penalties for every 
crime. They do no more than fetter the discretion of 
sentencing judges to do what they have done for 
generations -- impose sentences within the broad limits 
established by Congress."). Second, as the Jackson court 
succinctly stated, neither the plain language of 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1) nor the statute's legislative history reveals that 
Congress limited the term "cocaine base" to crack. See 968 
F.2d at 162. The only proper inference we can draw from 
Congress' use of the chemical term "cocaine base," without 
explanation or limitation, is that it intended the term to 
encompass all forms of cocaine base. 
 
We recognize that the Commission's 1993 amendment 
could arguably be construed as providing more specificity 
to the provisions already existent in the statute, and, in 
that sense, it does not alter what has already been 
legislated. In fact, we have previously acknowledged that 
the amendment conforms to Congress' intent to punish 
offenders who traffic in crack more severely than those who 
traffic in cocaine. See Holman, 168 F.3d at 658. However, 
focusing solely on that congruity obscures the limitations 
on permissible judicial constructions of a congressional 
statute. Cf. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 542 
(1996) ("statements in legislative history cannot be read to 
convert statutory leeway for judicial development of a rule 
on particularized exceptions into delegated authority to 
revise statutory categorization, untethered to any obligation 
to preserve the coherence of substantive congressional 
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judgments"). Whatever merit we should impart to the 
Commission for promulgating guidelines in accordance with 
Congress' desire to punish more severely certain drug 
trafficking, its wisdom is not germane to our construction 
of Congress' inclusion of mandatory minimum sentences in 
the drug statute itself. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 
223, 231 (1993) (characterizing as "dubious" the 
assumption that the Commission's guidelines are relevant 
to the construction of a sentencing statute). Thus, we are 
firmly convinced that the making of substantive (indeed, 
any) changes to the drug statutes is a task residing solely 
in the province of the Legislature and not in an arm of the 
Judiciary. Cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 377 ("[A]lthough 
Congress granted the Commission substantial discretion in 
formulating guidelines, in actuality it legislated a full 
hierarchy of punishment -- from near maximum 
imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some 
imprisonment, to alternatives -- and stipulated the most 
important offense and offender characteristics to place 
defendants within these categories"). Were it otherwise, the 
creation of the Sentencing Commission and the delegation 
to promulgate amendments to the statute itself would raise 
serious constitutional implications that would likely run 
afoul of the doctrines of legislative delegation and 
separation of powers. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 
748, 758 (1996) ("The fundamental precept of the 
delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs 
to Congress, U.S. Const., Art. I, S 1, and may not be 
conveyed to another branch or entity."); Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) ("[T]he 
Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers 
depends largely upon common understanding of what 
activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and 
to courts."); see generally Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-412 
(holding that, in creating the Sentencing Commission, 
Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor 
upset the balance of powers among the coordinate 
branches). 
 
Therefore, we hold that, while the term "cocaine base" 
means only crack when a sentence is imposed under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, "cocaine base" encompasses all 
forms of cocaine base with the same chemical formula 
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when the mandatory minimum sentences under 21 U.S.C. 
S 841(b)(1) are implicated. Accordingly, the controlled 
substance in this case, which was 85% pure cocaine base 
but not crack, subjects Barbosa to the statutory mandatory 
minimum for cocaine base. We thus affirm the District 




Aside from sentencing, Barbosa challenges the District 
Court's denial of his motion for a new trial based upon the 
discovery of the additional payments and reward monies to 
Disla and Morel. Specifically, Disla received an additional 
$500 payment a few days after the trial concluded in 
January 1999, and both informants received a $25,000 
reward in April 1999. We review the District Court's 
decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Saada, 
212 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The District Court is empowered to grant a new trial on 
the basis of newly discovered evidence "if the interests of 
justice so require." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The standard under 
Rule 33 is: 
 
       (a) the evidence must be in fact newly discovered, i.e. 
       discovered since trial; 
 
       (b) facts must be alleged from which the court may 
       infer diligence on the part of the movant; 
 
       (c) the evidence relied on must not be merely 
       cumulative or impeaching; 
 
       (d) it must be material to the issues involved; and 
 
       (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a 
       new trial, the newly discovered evidence would 
       probably produce an acquittal. 
 
Id. at 216 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 
774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
 
After a full hearing on the merits in which testimony was 
taken, the District Court found that there was no dispute 
that the later payments were newly discovered and that 
Barbosa's "indefatigable counsel was exemplary in his 
 
                                39 
 
 
diligence." However, the court also found that the final 
three factors had not been satisfied. That is, in light of the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt in the record, and defense 
counsel's searching cross-examination and closing in which 
he portrayed the informants as essentially on the DEA's 
payroll, the evidence of the additional payments was only 
cumulative or impeaching, and not material to the issue of 
entrapment. Thus, the court concluded (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1999)) that 
"this new evidence would in no way have `put the whole 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in 
the verdict, and would have been merely cumulative.' " 
 
Having reviewed the transcripts of both the trial and the 
Rule 33 hearing, we conclude that the District Court's 
factual findings with respect to the newly discovered 
evidence were not clearly erroneous. The additional 
payments to Disla and Morel, while concededly subject to 
disclosure so as to afford defense counsel an opportunity to 
cross-examine the informants on them, were not finalized 
or guaranteed, and, in fact, were only nominations at the 
time of trial. Moreover, none of the payments was in 
exchange for testimony, but for work completed on 
investigations for the DEA. Although the $25,000 rewards 
were quite large, they were primarily for the results of the 
extraordinary drug seizure in Aruba and not because of the 
apprehension and conviction of Barbosa. We also note that, 
although the record is replete with evidence of Barbosa's 
guilt, the District Court obviously felt that there was 
sufficient evidence on which to instruct the jury on his 
entrapment defense. 
 
Therefore, on these facts, we conclude that the District 
Court properly exercised its discretion to deny the new trial 
motion based upon this newly discovered evidence because 
that evidence would merely have been cumulative or 
impeaching, immaterial to the issue of entrapment, and 
would not have likely produced an acquittal. We will thus 




Finally, Barbosa challenges the entirety of his criminal 
proceedings, contending that the Government's conduct 
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resulting in his eventual arrest was outrageous as a matter 
of law. Specifically, Barbosa claims that the Government 
had orchestrated the entire narcotics transaction and had 
unnecessarily created an unreasonable risk of death. Citing 
the danger of digestive acids dissolving the packaging 
materials surrounding the swallowed pellets, Barbosa 
points to the increasing risk of a fatal mishap as more time 
elapses before the ingested drugs are expelled. 
Notwithstanding this risk of fatality, the Government 
purportedly solicited his assistance through its paid 
informants (particularly Disla) and induced him to travel to 
Aruba, to swallow approximately one kilogram of heroin, 
and then to return to the United States. Moreover, to 
further exacerbate that risk, the informants insisted that he 
accompany them by car for several hours to Philadelphia, 
thereby increasing the time during which the drugs 
remained in his system. (He surmises that the only reason 
for this leg of the journey was to establish jurisdiction in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for the arrest.) 
According to Barbosa, this risk was wholly unnecessary as 
the arrest could have been effectuated in Aruba (as the 
Government later did with Zorilla) and extradition 
proceedings commenced because the entire investigation 
was being handled with the full cooperation of the Aruban 
government. We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court's legal conclusions in denying Barbosa's motions to 
dismiss the indictment and review any challenges to the 
court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. 
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
It is well settled in this Circuit that "a criminal defendant 
may raise a due process challenge to an indictment against 
[him] based on a claim that the government employed 
outrageous law enforcement investigative techniques." 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 
1998) (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1064 (3d 
Cir. 1996)). In determining whether a defendant is entitled 
to a vacatur of the conviction based upon outrageous 
government conduct, we note that: 
 
       the challenged conduct must be shocking, outrageous, 
       and clearly intolerable. . . . The cases make it clear 
       that this is an extraordinary defense reserved for only 
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       the most egregious circumstances. It is not to be 
       invoked each time the government acts deceptively or 
       participates in a crime that it is investigating. Nor is it 
       intended merely as a device to circumvent the 
       predisposition test in the entrapment defense. Though 
       lacking in "mathematical precision," the "shocking, 
       outrageous, and clearly intolerable" standard provides 
       sufficient guidance to courts attempting to assess 
       whether particular government conduct is 
       fundamentally unfair and thereby offends due process. 
 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 231 (3d Cir. 
1998) (internal citations omitted). 
 
We recognize that Barbosa's life was arguably placed in 
danger by the Government's sting operation. We also 
recognize, however, that narcotics trafficking necessarily 
entails a risk of death or serious bodily harm, such as from 
the use of firearms and other enforcement measures to 
protect or seize the contraband and money, as well as from 
the ancillary criminal activity that accompanies the drug 
trade. In fighting this "war on drugs," law enforcement 
personnel have needed to develop a number of 
sophisticated and covert investigatory techniques. One of 
these techniques involves the creation of what appear to be 
authentic drug transactions, oftentimes with the joint 
participation of both law enforcement personnel (or their 
designees) and the targets of the investigation. Such 
subterfuge is a well recognized and permissible means of 
investigation. Therefore, endangerment to the lives of the 
agents, informants, and targets involved, which is inherent 
in the drug trafficking trade, must also be permissible. It is 
incumbent upon the government, however, to police its own 
conduct and consistently revisit the parameters and 
constitutionality of its enforcement activities. 
 
Smuggling narcotics into this country through swallowing 
or "body-packing" has unfortunately become both an 
effective and lucrative criminal enterprise. See, e.g., John 
Otis, The Drug Quagmire: Mules Ferry Drugs Across Borders 
in Game of Chance, Houston Chronicle, July 16, 2000, at 
30, available at 2000 WL 4311185 ("The technique . . . has 
become one of the most effective ways to smuggle heroin 
and cocaine out of Colombia . . . . [S]wallowers are believed 
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to be responsible for up to half the Colombian heroin that 
reaches the United States."). Yet, this mode of conveyance 
is fraught with grave peril to the courier (also called a 
"mule," "packer," or "swallower") in the rare but potentially 
real situation in which the wrapped pellets burst before 
they can be expelled. Drug swallowing can even be fatal 
because acids in the digestive tract can dissolve the latex 
packaging materials, thereby releasing massive doses of 
narcotics into the body. See, e.g., id.  (stating that eating 
solid foods after ingesting drugs causes release of gastric 
acids that can burn through the latex, leading to massive 
overdose and death); see also Edward Barnes, Undertaker 
For the Mules "Don Orlando" Is the Man to Call When 
Cocaine Couriers Perish On the Job, Time Mag., Aug. 18, 
1997, at 2, available at 1997 WL 10902776; Gary Wisby, 
Cocaine Smuggling Becomes Inside Job: "Packing" It 
Internally Risks Death -- Officials, Chicago-Sun Times, 
June 23, 1997, at 4, available at 1997 WL 6356660. 
 
The dangers inherent in the targeted criminal activity 
comprise a threshold level, which, if unreasonably 
surpassed by the Government in zealously pursuing an 
investigation or prosecution, would offend fundamental 
fairness and due process. We believe that such a guiding 
principle comports with our outrageous government 
conduct jurisprudence, at least as applied to the distinctive 
norms found in the context of modern drug trafficking 
activities. 
 
However cold or callous the Government's stance towards 
Barbosa may seem, this case does not involve the classic 
example of a courier (perhaps with low income, low 
education, and little practical skills) who was enticed, 
coerced, or exploited by an affluent, sophisticated drug 
dealer to smuggle drugs into the United States through 
ingestion. See, e.g., Smugglers Who Swallow Drugs Risk 
Death For Cash, Sun-Sentinel, July 23, 2000, at 4B, 
available at 2000 WL 22186881 ("Customs Special Agent 
Zach Man said smugglers recruit poor men and women to 
carry drugs into the country, often promising weekend 
vacations in South Florida and the chance to make`more 
money in a single trip than they make in an entire year.' "); 
Mireya Navarro, Big Gulp in Cali Can Bring Hard Time, Fast 
 
                                43 
 
 
Death in Miami, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nov. 5, 1995, at 
A9, available at 1995 WL 9541894 (reprinting Nov. 2, 1995 
N.Y. Times article) (describing coercion defense at trial of 
Colombian businessman who claimed he had been 
kidnaped by men and forced to swallow pellets containing 
heroin). On this record, Barbosa was apparently a willing 
participant in the operation to smuggle drugs to 
Philadelphia from Aruba, and he exhibited a level of 
professionalism concerning the activity of drug swallowing 
not typically found in the average courier. 
 
At trial, the evidence revealed that Barbosa was 
extremely knowledgeable about packaging and swallowing 
drugs. He told the informants that he regularly engaged in 
swallowing drugs for other dealers and further claimed that 
he managed persons who brought drugs into the country 
through swallowing, even teaching them how do it. Barbosa 
had, in fact, been previously convicted in federal court for 
drug smuggling using the same illicit methodology, and as 
the recorded conversations demonstrated, Barbosa was 
aware of the going price of heroin in both Aruba and New 
York. He revealed the extent of his swallowing expertise by 
dictating the travel arrangements, both going to and 
returning from Aruba, and by timing the drug transaction, 
both as to when he would swallow the pellets and as to 
when he would discharge them. While Barbosa claims that 
he would never have met Disla or Morel were it not for the 
actions of the Government, Barbosa neglects to 
acknowledge that his introduction to Disla was facilitated 
by Zorilla, whom he had previously known. Indeed, the 
Government was not even aware of Barbosa until his 
meeting with Disla, and Disla had no way in which to 
contact Barbosa except through his pager number. 
Moreover, it was Barbosa who made the arrangements with 
Zorilla for the delivery of the drugs in Philadelphia. And in 
that respect, we note that his acquiescence in being driven 
to Philadelphia was voluntary and not compelled by Disla 
or the DEA. Although the record also showed that he was 
unable to dictate to Zorilla his preferred pellet size and did 
not package the pellets himself, Barbosa neither questioned 
Zorilla about the contents of the pellets nor inquired into 
the manner in which they were packaged. This brazen 
display of confidence in the integrity of the contraband he 
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was about to ingest stands in stark contrast to any reckless 
behavior we might impute to the Government in permitting 
him to proceed with the transaction. 
 
In arranging for Barbosa's arrest in the Philadelphia hotel 
room, the DEA unmistakably facilitated and brought to 
fruition the illegal drug trafficking from Aruba. However, 
the Government neither initiated this particular 
transaction, provided any expertise on the swallowing 
technique, nor supplied the illegal contraband. DEA agents 
were also absent during the entire time Barbosa was in 
Aruba and had only Barbosa's limited contact by phone 
with Disla to verify what had transpired in the hotel room 
in Aruba with Zorilla and the drugs. The DEA also had no 
obligation to have agents in Aruba or to make the arrest in 
Aruba where it was not permitted to exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction. Indeed, it is well established that"[l]aw 
enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to 
call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have 
the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a 
quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the 
amount necessary to support a criminal conviction." Hoffa 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). 
 
Barbosa nonetheless contends that, despite his professed 
expertise in swallowing almost a kilogram of drugs, he 
should not be judged upon his own willingness to risk his 
own life, and that factors beyond his control could prolong 
the time during which the drugs were in his system, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that the pellets would 
explode in his system. However, the fact that there was no 
evidence that Barbosa had any difficulty in executing the 
swallowing or that he feared for his safety militates against 
any possible argument that the Government was on notice 
that the risk to Barbosa was unacceptably compromised. 
Given the inherent risk of death or serious bodily harm in 
drug trafficking through swallowing, there would have to be 
evidence in the record that the Government unreasonably 
increased that risk before we would be compelled to 
conclude that the Government's conduct was "shocking, 
outrageous, and clearly intolerable." At best, the record 
revealed that Barbosa may have exhibited some 
nervousness in the car ride to Philadelphia; but the 
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Government would not have even known that fact until well 
after their arrival at the hotel when, presumably, the DEA 
agents debriefed Disla and/or Salcedo. As the record 
revealed, agents arrested Barbosa immediately after he 
safely expelled all the pellets. 
 
Barbosa also urges us to adopt a rule of law that drug 
swallowing is so life threatening that it is per se violative for 
the Government to place a defendant in the position of a 
courier who swallows drugs and transports them. However, 
there is nothing in the record or even general common 
sense notions from which to draw such a blanket rule. On 
the contrary, a per se rule would place severe restrictions 
on the ability of law enforcement personnel to combat 
narcotics trafficking. Indeed, as we have previously noted, 
"[n]o federal judge can be unaware of the vastness of 
government undercover operations which seek to 
apprehend those engaged in that reprehensible trade." 
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 609; see also 
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("One cannot easily exaggerate the 
problems confronted by law enforcement authorities in 
dealing effectively with an expanding narcotics traffic, 
which is one of the major contributing causes of escalating 
crime in our cities.") (citations omitted). In accord with our 
analysis above, a court's evaluation of a particular 
governmental enforcement tactic must be conducted in the 
context of the specific law enforcement problem to which 
that tactic is directed. Under the facts of this case, the 
Government's use of a known drug swallower in a sting 
operation did not rise to a level of outrageousness sufficient 
to offend Barbosa's due process rights. 
 
In sum, the Government had every reason to believe in 
good faith that Barbosa was a willing participant in this 
highly dangerous form of drug trafficking, and thus, its 
conduct was not sufficiently "shocking, outrageous, and 
clearly intolerable" such that a vacatur of the conviction is 
warranted. Under the evidence adduced at trial, we 
conclude that the Government's conduct here was not 
fundamentally unfair and offensive to due process, and 
therefore, we affirm the conviction on this ground. 
 





For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Barbosa was 
properly sentenced based upon the cocaine base he 
unwittingly, but actually, brought into the country, and 
that the District Court properly imposed the statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence for cocaine base. We further 
conclude that the District Court properly denied Barbosa's 
motion for a new trial based upon the newly discovered 
evidence of additional payments to the two government 
informants. Finally, we conclude that the District Court 
properly denied his motions to dismiss the indictment for 
outrageous government conduct. Accordingly, we affirm the 
District Court's judgment. 
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